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Abstract — In this paper, simple mathematical models from Control Theory are applied to
three very important economic paradigms, namely (a) minimum wages in self-regulating
markets, (b) market-versus-true values and currency rates, and (c) government spending and
taxation levels. Analytical solutions are provided in all three paradigms and some useful
conclusions are drawn in terms of variable analysis. This short study can be used as an
example of how feedback models and stability analysis can be applied as a guideline of
’proofs’ in the context of economic policies.
Index Terms — economic policies, public spending, regulated markets, control theory,
feedback analysis, minimum wages, currency rates, taxation rates, stable growth.
THERE is a frequently-stated assertion that labor cost is not
the driving factor for production cost per unit, even when the
selling unit is not a product but some service. However, in
times of crisis and austerity, labor costs are almost always the
first (and usually the only) factor that is ’relaxed’ to lower and
lower levels by enterprises, in an effort to keep the margin of
profit stable when selling rates decline. Some economists
justify these policies as the typical ’rule of thumb’: when
profits decline, the workers will be paid less and less, until
either the business recovers or bankrupts. Others say that its
is exactly the recipe of failure, since underpaid workers will
rarely work twice as hard to get the business back on it feet -
quite the opposite.
Similarly, incentives for new private investments, e.g. low
tax rates, are often compared to public spending and the reg-
ulatory policies are usually criticized as ’killers’ for those
incentives. However, there is a definite link between changes
in the investment flows and the inherent gap between mar-
ket value and true value of products and services: exces-
sively positive prospects cause a positive feedback in new
investments flow, while the exact opposite happens in times
of crises and markets downfall. This oscillatory feedback is
(should be) negated by an opposite feedback, usually real-
ized under regulatory policies (e.g. increasing tax rates and
government spending), in order to avoid the systemic risk
of value ’bubbles’ in both the market level and a country’s
overall GDP change rate.
However, this is not the case in the real world; in fact,
the exact opposite happens. This is a ’paradox’ of budget-
ing policies and government spending that are based on false
Manuscript prepared by H.G. in LyX using the APA class.
Email: xgeorgio@di.uoa.gr — http://xgeorgio.info
paradigms, hence the end result is typically a self-reinforcing
spiral: when things go well, hope and money flow go up
too; when things turn bad, more austerity policies lead to the
typical ’spiral of death’, for a business or a whole country’s
economy. This is a fundamental issue of high controversy
among leading economists and one that will be investigated
in-depth under several mathematical formulations in the next
sections.
This is by no means a complete paper on economic poli-
cies nor in-depth analysis of some of the most important is-
sues in modern economics; it is rather a simple, purely math-
ematical approach to three very important paradigms, a short
study that can be used as an example of how feedback mod-
els and stability analysis from classic Control Theory can be
applied as a guideline of ’proofs’ in the context of economic
policies.
The paper is organized as follows: The first section is a
short formulation for the problem of minimum wages and
their importance in self-regulating markets, under the scope
of gain-cost analysis of private firms. Next, the core issues
of currency rates and differences between market value and
true (hidden) value are investigated under the scope of a first-
order feedback model, as well as a stability analysis with re-
gard to private-versus-public spending rates. Finally, gov-
ernment spending, public workers’ wages and the general
taxation level are described in the context of a differential
equations model as mutually dependent variables of the same
(economic) system. Analytical solutions are provided in all
three paradigms and some useful conclusions are drawn in
terms of variable analysis.
Minimum wages and
self-regulating labor markets
In order to investigate this ’labor cost shrinkage’ dilemma
and provide some model-based guidelines, the driving force
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of every profit-focused enterprise can be formulated in cor-
respondence to the ’labor cost’ variable. Let w = ∑ pk be the
sum of the pk wages for all k workers, i.e., the enterprise’s
total labor cost per production unit. Let NC (w) be the total
cost per production unit, including labor cost, as a weighted
sum of n individual factors. Without loss of generality, as-
sume that the labor cost is at index i = 1, hence its weight
in the total production cost is α1 and is singled out from the
sum:
NC (w) =
n∑
i=1
αi · zi = α1 · w +
n∑
i=2
αi · zi (1)
The net profit NP (w) per sold unit is proportional to the
difference between the maximum attainable market (selling)
price MPrmax and the total cost per unit NC (w), i.e., the
maximum margin of profit, while inversely proportional to
the total labor cost w:
NP (w) ∝ MPrmax − NC (w)
w
(2)
Substituting (1) in (2) we have:
NP (w) =
MPmax −
(
α1 · w +
n∑
i=2
αi · zi
)
w
=
C
w
− α1 (3)
where C = MPrmax −
n∑
i=2
αi · zi > 0 is a constant with
respect to w and αi are typical convex weighting factors,
i.e.:
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 , 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1.
In order to find the maximum attainable value for NP (w),
the first- and second-order derivatives against w must be cal-
culated:
∂NP(w)
∂w
=
∂
∂w
(C
w
− α1
)
=
−C
w2
w≥w0≥0
=⇒
C>0
∂NP(w)
∂w
≤ 0
∂2NP(w)
∂w2
=
∂
∂w
(
−C
w2
)
=
2C
w3
w≥w0≥0
=⇒
C>0
∂2NP(w)
∂w2
≥ 0
In other words, the negative sign of the first-order deriva-
tive shows (as expected) that NP (w) decreases as w increases
above some minimum allowable value w0 (employing mini-
mum wages for the workers), while the positive sign of the
second-order derivative shows that the function curves up-
wards. These conditions are typical to all functions y = xp
where k ≤ 1, like in this case. Hence, the function is maxi-
mized at the lower limit w = w0:
max
w
NP (w)
s.t. : w ≥ w0 ≥ 0
}
⇒ lim
w→w0
NP (w) =
= lim
w→w0
(
C
w
− α1
)
= C
w0
− α1 = NPw0
(4)
where NPw0 is the maximum attainable net profit per sold
unit with regard to labor cost. Obviously, when there is no
minimum-wage limit, i.e., w0 = 0, the net profit w.r.t. labor
cost is sky-rocketed to infinity:
max
w
NP (w)
s.t. : w ≥ w0 = 0
}
⇒ lim
w→0
NP (w) =
= lim
w→0
(
C
w
− α1
)
= +∞ = NP0
(5)
What (5) proves is nothing new:
The best labor wages policy, i.e., the one that provides the
maximum gain-per-salary ratio, is slavery (free labor - no
salaries at all).
However, the most important conclusion from this result
is the fact that the minimum wage limit, as it is usually legis-
lated by laws and government policies, is actually not some-
thing that can be ’discovered’ by a totally free (unregulated)
market. If salaries can go down to zero, no enterprise has a
serious incentive, profit-wise, to offer a decent wage to any-
one. In fact, even when minimum wage limits do exist in a
labor market, the difference between this lower threshold and
the actual mean value of offered wages is only marginal; it
only relies on the various enterprises’ competitiveness over
very few capable candidates for many open positions. Of
course, this is hardly the case in the real world where the ex-
act opposite is the rule, i.e., many highly qualified candidates
have to compete for a limited number of job openings.
A first-order feedback control
model for stable currency rates
The starting point for the following model-based approach
is the assertion that there is a distinct difference between the
true economy and the currency used in it. That is, each com-
modity or labor effort has a specific ’hidden’ value that is
invariant with respect to a currency that is used to ’translate’
it into monetary value. This assertion is valid for any such
currency, even those that are bounded to a specific commod-
ity, e.g. gold or silver, since no one commodity can be used
a the universal baseline for this evaluation: a huge amount of
gold is next to worthless when it can not buy food or water
if there are nowhere to be found. On the other hand, a single
worker can produce a specific amount of work (on average),
just as one apple tree can produce (on the same soil and cli-
mate) more or less the same amount of apples, which in turn
contain the same amount of nutrients and calories. Hence,
the market price of a single apple or a single man-hour of
work, which is mainly a factor offer and demand, is not a
valid invariant metric of its true value.
Furthermore, on monetary systems that are based on a
representative currency, i.e., some form of printed money
or bonds, there is no inherent link between the total volume
of currency available to spend and the total volume of com-
modities and labor to purchase - when there is more money
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than goods, inflation occurs. More money means higher
prices for the exact same commodities, just like less com-
modities means higher prices at the same total amount of
money. It all depends on who controls the total amount of
currency available for spending and how this is carefully bal-
anced against the total amount of commodities to purchase.
Basic model
Let Vm be the market price of the commodity, labor effort
or even the currency itself and let Vt be the corresponding
’true’ value. These two values are correlated linearly by a
parameter ρ that corresponds to inflation and deflation effects
in the economy:
Vm = (ρ + 1) · Vt (6)
When ρ > 0 then inflation occurs, i.e., the market price is
higher than it should for some specific commodity or work
effort unit, while ρ < 0 means deflation, i.e., the market price
of the same commodity gets devalued. Grouping inflation
effects as ε+ and deflation effects as ε−, the adjustment pa-
rameter now becomes ρ = ε+ − ε−.
Let us now consider these two factors, ε+ and ε−. During
inflation, there is a positive sign in the change rate of the
market price Vm against the true value Vt, i.e.:
ε+ = c+ ·
dVm
dVt
(7)
where c+ ≥ 0 is a constant. Likewise, during deflation,
there is a negative sign in the change rate of the market price
Vm against the true value Vt, i.e.:
ε− = c− ·
dVm
dVt
(8)
where c− ≥ 0 is a constant. Equations (7) and (8) essen-
tially link the parameter ρ in (6) with the change rate of the
market price Vm against the true value Vt. In other words, the
inflation and deflation effects are expressed as a function of
the first derivative of Vm against Vt.
The terms ’inflation’ and ’deflation’ here are somewhat
misleading, since they are usually linked to increasing and
decreasing prices, respectively, in the market. Here, ’in-
flation’ is linked to its primary definition, i.e., the increas-
ing availability and flow of money in the market, a situation
that favors ’cheaper’ currency, easier loans and incentives for
riskier investments. This means that when the money flow in-
creases, into the economy (private investments, low taxation
levels, economy growth, etc), the incentives for moving even
more money into it increases, since profitable businesses are
plenty. On the other hand, ’deflation’ here is also linked to its
primary definition, i.e., the decreasing availability and flow
of money in the market, a situation that results in ’expensive’
currency, harder loans and incentives for more conservative
(or no) investments. This means that when the money flow
decreases, out of the economy (outgoing foreign exchange,
high taxation levels, economy shrinking, etc), the incentives
for putting more and more money away from it increases,
since profitable investments are scarce. In other words, equa-
tions (7) and (8) translate the momentum of Vm against Vt
into quantifiable feedback, reinforcing (positive) or dampen-
ing (negative), according to the relation between c+ and c−.
There is also a definite link between inflation/deflation and
interest rates in bank loans: during inflation, the governments
and central banks try to ’slow down’ excessive loaning and
credit card use by raising the baseline for interest rates, while
during deflation they try to ’boost’ the economy by lowering
this baseline and thus enabling more money flow in the mar-
ket. Here, these ’correcting’ actions are essentially included
in both c+ and c−, according to the direction these authorities
want to employ into (7) and (8) and, in the end, into (6) as
well.
Analytical solution
The model described by (6) now becomes a differential
equation that is to be solved, i.e., fully defines Vm as a func-
tion of Vt. The following steps show how:
Vm = (ρ + 1) · Vt = (ε+ − ε− + 1) · Vt
=
(
(c+ − c−) · dVmdVt + 1
)
· Vt
⇔ (c+ − c−) · Vt · dVmdVt − Vm + Vt = 0
⇔ (c+ − c−) · x · dydx − y + x = 0
⇔
dy
dx +
(
−1
c+−c−
)
·
y
x
+
(
1
c+−c−
)
= 0
⇔
dy
dx = β ·
y
x
− β = F
( y
x
)
(9)
where y = Vm, x = Vt and β = 1c+−c− . The last step in
the previous sequence is essentially a typical transformation
into a well-known form of differential equations that can be
solved by substituting z = y
x
and calculating the integral:
dy
dx = β ·
y
x
− β = F
( y
x
)
(
z = y
x
)
⇒ ln x =
∫
dz
F(z)−z + α
ln x =
∫ dz
F(z)−z =
∫ d( yx )(β· yx−β)−( yx )
=
∫ d( yx )
y
x
·(β−1)+(−β) =
∫ dz
z·(β−1)+(−β)
= 1(β−1) · ln (z · (β − 1) + (−β))
⇔ ln x = 1(β−1) · ln (z · (β − 1) + (−β))
⇔ ln x(β−1) = ln
( y
x
· (β − 1) + (−β)
)
⇔ x(β−1) = y
x
· (β − 1) + (−β)
⇔ (β − 1) · y = xβ + β · x
⇔ y =
(
1
β−1
)
· xβ +
(
β
β−1
)
· x (10)
Hence, from the final result an analytical formula of Vm
with regard to Vt becomes available:
Vm =
(
1
β − 1
)
· Vβt +
(
β
β − 1
)
· Vt β =
1
c+ − c−
(11)
Note that (11) is more or less the long-term expansion of
(6). That is, (6) is the ’instance’ definition of Vm with regard
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to Vt as a differential equation, while in (11) Vm is defined
only as a function of Vt (no differentials) and some constant
parameters. This analytical form is appropriate for calculat-
ing stability and feedback factors as the result of these con-
stant parameters and how they affect the relation between Vm
and Vt.
As a verification step, one can calculate the differential
term dydx by its starting definition in (9) and by its analytical
solution in (10). From (9) this calculation gives:
dy
dx = β ·
y
x
− β = β ·
(
xβ+β·x
β−1
)
· x−1 = ... =
(
β
β−1
)
·
(
xβ−1 + β
)
Similarly, from (10) the same calculation gives:
dy
dx =
(
1
β−1
)
·
d(xβ+β·x)
dx =
β·xβ−1+β
β−1 =
(
β
β−1
)
·
(
xβ−1 + β
)
Hence, (11) is a valid analytical solution of (6).
Stability and feedback analysis
Equation (11) provides a full description for Vm with re-
gard to Vt and the means to analyze its asymptotic behavior.
Since β is the only parameter that includes all model config-
uration, it is the main factor of interest here. Specifically, it
is evident that as |β| increases, i.e., as the difference |c+ − c−|
becomes smaller, Vm exhibits larger exponent in Vt. This
means that Vm either increases at higher rates (when β > 0)
or drives the first term to zero (when β < 0). Furthermore,
as |β| becomes larger, the coefficient β
β−1 of the second term
in (11) approaches unity. In other words, as c+ approaches
c−, Vm and Vt become directly proportional (not just linearly
dependent).
Combining these previous comments with respect to β, it
is clear that if Vm is to be ’stabilized’ against Vt, β can be
selected accordingly in order to diminish the first (higher-
order) term and reinforce the second (linear) term. This hap-
pens only when |β| ≫ 1 and β < 0, i.e., as β→ −∞:
Vm =
(
1
β − 1
)
· Vβt +
(
β
β − 1
)
· Vt
β→−∞
−→ V+t (12)
where V+t means that it is approached from higher values
as β becomes more and more negative. In other words:
β→ −∞ ⇔ c+ − c− → 0− =⇒ Vm → V+t (13)
What equation (13) says is pretty clear:
If market prices of commodities and work effort are to
be kept close to their true values, the negative feedback
factors (high taxes, high interest rates, high government
spending, etc) should closely match the positive feedback
factors (low taxes, low interest rates, strict government
spending, etc).
This result is not something unexpected; keeping taxes
and interest rates high is the standard policy for slowing
down a booming economy into a ’controlled growth’ state.
This is necessary to avoid excessive debt increase in both
public and private sector, as well as decreasing the incen-
tives of ’bubbles’ in stock markets. However, what is very
interesting is that the proper control policy is for the au-
thorities to counter match the positive feedback with propor-
tional negative feedback actions. In other words, government
spending, taxation levels and interest rates should always in-
crease/decrease in proportion to private investments, creation
of new businesses and incoming flow of foreign capital.
Unfortunately, the idea of a deliberate slowdown in the
economy is something that is often unthinkable for modern
free trades and stock markets - this is why (12) and (13) also
constitute a very realistic explanation of the various financial
crises, like the dot-com bubble of the late ’90s or the 2008
house market crash in USA: when negative feedback is not
enforced, the catastrophic deviation of Vm from Vt becomes
a mathematical certainty.
Government spending and stable
taxation level
One of the most controversial issues in all economic mod-
els is the acceptable amount of government spending for pub-
lic services, infrastructure and government salaries. In gen-
eral, the amount of government budget available for spend-
ing is directly proportional to the country’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP):
{GDP} = C + I +G + (X − M) ∼ S + P = W (14)
Basic model
Equation (14) is the typical calculation of GDP: C is for
consumption, I is for investments and savings (domestic),
G is for government spending and (X − M) is the exports-
imports (net) balance. Reformulating these parameters, let
W be the GDP portion attributed to salaries of workers in
the public and the private sector, i.e., S and P respectively.
Public spending on infrastructure can be reformulated as the
weighted sum of N factors, each contributing αi to the total
spending:
Gs =
∑
αigi i = 1, ..., N
∑
αi = 1 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1
Similarly, a ’public welfare’ index can be calculated as a
weighted sum of K factors, each contributing γi to the index,
that affect availability of public services to the people:
Gw =
∑
γk (1 − hk) k = 1, ..., K
∑
γk = 1 0 ≤ γk ≤ 1
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where hk is the fraction of people without access to public
service k. Clearly, there is a link between Gs and Gw, i.e.,
Gw ∼ Gs.
Let us now focus on the government budget that need to
cover for public workers’ salaries S and public spending Gs.
Let Q+be the positive flow, which is essentially the sum of
taxes on wages to all workers (public and private sector),
and let Q− be the negative flow, which goes to S and public
spending Gs. If 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 is the balancing factor between
salaries and infrastructure in government spending and p is
the balancing factor between private sector and public sector
fractions in the total work force, then:
Q+ = (S + P) · t = (W · (1 − p) + W · p) · t = W · t
Q− = (1 − c) · ˆS +Gs · c = (1 − c) · (1 − t) · S +Gs · c
For a long-term viable budget management without defi-
ciencies, huge reserving and external loans, then the posi-
tive/negative flows should be roughly equal:
Q+ ≃ Q− ⇔ S · t + P · t ≃ (1 − c) · (1 − t) · S +Gs · c
Q+−Q− = W ·t−(1 − c) ·(1 − t) ·(1 − p) ·W−Gs ·c = ϕ (15)
where ϕ is the instantaneous (annual) balance in the gov-
ernment budget. The model presented above assumes per-
fect mechanisms for spending, paying salaries and collect-
ing taxes. For a more realistic calculation, deficiency factors
have to be introduced in all the major components in (15),
i.e.:
tˆ = t · (1 − εt) , 0 ≤ εt ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
ˆW = W · (1 − εw) , 0 ≤ εw ≤ 1
ˆG = G ·
(
1 − εg
)
, 0 ≤ εg ≤ 1
ϕˆ = ϕ ·
(
1 − εϕ
)
, 0 ≤ εϕ ≤ 1
Here, εt stands for deficiency in collecting taxes, εw stands
for deficiency in work effort (outsourced workers), εg stands
for deficiency in constructing and maintaining public ser-
vices (corruption) and εϕ stands for deficiency due to infla-
tion (domestic currency devaluation). These adjusted com-
ponents can be introduced directly into (15) for proper cal-
culations; however, for the shake of simplicity, the simplified
model of (15) will be used as-is, since this choice does not
affect the analysis that follows.
Analytical solution
Returning now to (14), the investments component I can
be expressed as a factor of W, meaning that the amount of
money available for domestic spending drives the incentives
for more investments, new businesses and foreign capitals:
I = ξ ·W · (1 − t) · (1 + ϑ) ϑ, ξ ≥ 0 (16)
where ξ is the amount of available money W · (1 − t) (after
taxation) that goes into investments and ϑ is the multiplier
that is attributed to foreign capital that comes into the do-
mestic economy as investments too. Hence, the true annual
change in W can now be stated as a function of ϕ and I as:
△W = ϕ + I
= W · t − (1 − c) · (1 − t) · (1 − p) ·W −Gs · c
+ ξ · W · (1 − t) · (1 + ϑ)
(17)
Equation (17) is a differential model that links W with its
change rate and all the other factors. Since it is stated in a
discrete form (annual changes), it can be solved as a first-
order iterative equation, defining an = Wn and substituting
for all the other factors:
an+1 = an · (A + B) +C ⇔ an+1 − an · (A + B) = C (18)
A = t − (1 − c) · (1 − t) · (1 − p) (19)
B = ξ · (1 − t) · (1 + ϑ) (20)
C = −Gs · c (21)
Equation (18) is solved by calculating the solution of the
corresponding homogeneous system (C = 0) and then trying
a solution similar to the right-hand side of the general equa-
tion. The solution of the homogeneous system is:
dn+1 − dn · (A + B) = 0
λ − (A + B) = 0 ⇒ λ = A + B ⇒ dn = (A + B)n · d0 (22)
Since the right-hand side of (18) is a zero-order polyno-
mial, a constant can be introduced as a solution to the general
equation:
aˆ = b0 ⇒ b0 − (A + B) · b0 = C ⇔ b0 = C1 − (A + B) (23)
Then, the complete solution of (18) is the sum of the par-
tial solutions of (22) and (23), i.e.:
an = dn + aˆ = (A + B)n · d0 + b0 (24)
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where d0 is a constant that can be calculated directly by
using any value for n, i.e.:
n = 0 → a0 = 1 · d0 + b0 ⇔ d0 = a0 − b0 (25)
Substituting (23) and (25) into (24), the final solution for
an becomes:
an = (A + B)n · (a0 − b0) + b0
= (A + B)n ·
(
a0 −
C
1−(A+B)
)
+ C1−(A+B)
or in terms of the original W parameter:
Wn+1 = (A + B)n ·
(
W0 −
C
1 − (A + B)
)
+
C
1 − (A + B) (26)
where W0 is a constant corresponding to some starting
value for W. Hence, the total amount of money available
as workers’ salaries (public and private sectors) is now ex-
pressed as a function of all the other parameters of (15) and
(16).
Stability and feedback analysis
In order to evaluate the stability constraints for the model
described in (26), the most important factor is the base of
the exponent, i.e., (A + B). The same result can be drawn by
applying the z-transformation to the original model in (18):
Wn+1 − (A + B) ·Wn = C
F(z)
−→ H (z)
H (z) = C
1 − (A + B) · z−1 ←→ h (n) = C · (A + B)
n · u (n)
(27)
It is clear from (27) that, in order for the system to be
stable, the constraint |A+ B| ≤ 1 needs to be true in all cases.
Let us now examine the case A + B ≤ 1 with regard to the
taxation level t, applying (19) for A and (20) for B:
A + B ≤ 1
⇔ t − (1 − c) · (1 − t) · (1 − p) + ξ · (1 − t) · (1 + ϑ) ≤ 1
⇔ t · (1 + (1 − c) · (1 − p) − ξ · (1 + ϑ))
− ((1 − c) · (1 − p) − ξ · (1 + ϑ)) ≤ 1
⇔ t · (1 + τ) − τ ≤ 1
where:
τ = (1 − c) · (1 − p) − ξ · (1 + ϑ) (28)
and finally we get:
t ≤
1 + τ
1 + τ
= 1 (29)
Similarly, for the lower bound we get:
A + B ≥ −1
⇔ t − (1 − c) · (1 − t) · (1 − p) + ξ · (1 − t) · (1 + ϑ) ≥ −1
⇔ t · (1 + τ) − τ ≥ −1
which gives:
t · (1 + τ) − τ ≥ −1 ⇔ t ≥ −1 + τ
1 + τ
(30)
Combining (29) and (30), and since 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, we get the
final range for ’stable’ taxation level:
max
{
0, −1 + τ
1 + τ
}
≤ t ≤ 1 (31)
Equation (31) is essentially a range constraint for t and
describes the stability conditions for W with respect to the
taxation level. In practice, if the lower bound becomes posi-
tive, this range is shrinking towards the upper bound, i.e., the
taxation levels are forced to be higher in order to maintain a
stable budget management. Using (28) this translates to:
−1 + τ
1 + τ
> 0 ⇔ τ > 1 ⇔ (1 − c)·(1 − p) > 1+ξ·(1 + ϑ) (32)
The result stated by (32) is indeed a very interesting one:
For a stable spending of government budget, the avail-
able range for the taxation level is shrinking towards the
higher limit as the total number of public workers and/or
the spending weight (i.e., wages level) of their salaries
becomes larger than the domestic and foreign investments
(incoming flow).
This statement per-se is completely expected, as govern-
ment budget comes from taxes and foreign capital invest-
ments (assuming no long-term policies for debt deficiencies
are allowed). However, if the total government spending is
assumed constant, (32) states that the system can also be sta-
bilized by allocating more funds to public infrastructure and
services instead of public workers’ wages. In other words,
budgets cuts (austerity) is not necessarily the only solution
available.
Equation (32) incorporates c and p as negative terms,
while ξ and ϑ as positive ones, hence it is fairly easy to come
with another interesting result: Since p corresponds to the
fraction of work force employed in the private sector, (32)
implies that having an excessively large number of private
sector workers, with regard to true investments, essentially
destabilizes the system. This assertion can be explained by
the fact that excessive private worker force means excessive
sum of salaries available for spending, thus increased attrac-
tion of domestic and foreign funds for new investments. This
incentive essentially destabilizes the control of △W in (17)
and may cause a catastrophic oscillation (market bubbles).
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Therefore, the proper stabilization action is for the govern-
ment to ’slow down’ any excessive increases, a result similar
to the one stated at the end of the previous paradigm (see pre-
vious section). This action is usually executed by employing
higher taxes and limiting incoming flow of investment funds
- policies that are usually considered unthinkable for modern
free trades and stock markets.
Conclusion
In this paper, simple mathematical models from Con-
trol Theory were applied to three very important economic
paradigms, namely (a) minimum wages in self-regulating
markets, (b) market-versus-true values and currency rates,
and (c) government spending and taxation levels.
The main conclusions are:
• The best labor wages policy, i.e., the one that provides
the maximum gain-per-salary ratio, is slavery (free labor - no
salaries at all).
• Even when minimum wage limits do exist in a labor
market, the difference between this lower threshold and the
actual mean value of offered wages is only marginal.
• If market prices of commodities and work effort are to
be kept close to their true values, the negative feedback fac-
tors (high taxes, high interest rates, high government spend-
ing, etc) should closely match the positive feedback factors
(low taxes, low interest rates, strict government spending,
etc).
• For stable economies, the proper control policy is for
the authorities (government) to counter match the positive
feedback (private investments) with proportional negative
feedback actions.
• For a stable spending of government budget, the avail-
able range for the taxation level is shrinking towards the
higher limit as the total number of public workers and/or the
spending weight (i.e., wages level) of their salaries becomes
larger than the domestic and foreign investments (incoming
flow).
• If the total government spending is assumed constant,
the budget can also be stabilized by allocating more funds to
public infrastructure and services instead of public workers’
wages (i.e. wages cuts is not the only ’correcting’ solution).
This short study that can be used as an example of how feed-
back models and stability analysis can be applied as a guide-
line of ’proofs’ in the context of economic policies.
